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INTRODUCTION
The way that juries determine damages has always been a
mystery worth investigating.1
Particularly intriguing are the
deliberations that lead to million or even billion dollar verdicts.2 The
awe-inspiring breadth of these verdicts – even if they are short-lived –
has provoked an independent political movement to curb their excesses.3
Yet simultaneous with this concern over the runaway jury is a
fundamental desire to protect the integrity of the jury process and
maintain respect for the jury’s function and decisions. The concurrent
desires to exalt and to rein in the jury come face-to-face in laws aimed to
cap the damages that a jury can award in a civil case. Damage cap
statutes expressly limit the power of the jury to provide monetary relief
to plaintiffs.4 However, some statutes, case law, and commentators
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See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us
About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM
137 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
2
See, e.g., Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL
33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (jury verdict awarding $145 billion in punitive
damages), rev’d sub nom. Liggett Group, Inc. v. Engle, 853 So.2d 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
3
See Terry Carter, It’s B-a-a-a-ck: With Republicans in Charge, Will Tort Reform
Finally Have Its Day?, 46 ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT 3, 3 (December 6, 2002) (“Most
talked about [potential Congressional tort reforms] are legislative proposals concerning
asbestos litigation, medical malpractice liability, class action venues and perhaps some
limitations on punitive damages.”).
4
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2000). For a discussion of the reforms enacted
by roughly sixty percent of states in 1986, see Nancy L. Manzer, Note, 1986 Tort
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suggest that informing the jury of the caps threatens the integrity of the
jury decision-making process.5 The 1991 Civil Rights Act offers one
such statutory example of protecting defendants from more expensive
jury awards while attempting to maintain the “integrity” of these awards.
Prior to the 1991 Civil Rights Act, plaintiffs bringing federal
employment discrimination claims were entitled only to the most basic
relief: reinstatement and back wages, reduced by interim earnings that
had or should have been earned.6 This equitable relief was awarded by
judges, rather than juries; plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial.7 The
1991 Act changed all this, and in so doing has been recognized as a
watershed moment in employment discrimination litigation.8 Now,
either party may demand a trial by jury.9 And instead of simply seeking
reinstatement and back pay, plaintiffs can demand compensatory
damages for future pecuniary losses, as well as emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, and other non-pecuniary losses.10 Additionally, if the
defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference, the plaintiff may
recover punitive damages.11 The new damages radically improved the
potential relief available to federal employment discrimination plaintiffs,
opening up the possibility for much larger judgments.
These pro-plaintiff changes were mitigated somewhat by caps on
the punitive and compensatory damages.12 These caps are scaled
according to the size of the defendant employer and are unrelated to the
severity of the offense.13 Such caps are not unique; a number of other
statutes expressly limit the recovery of damages to a set or formulated

Reform Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on
Joint and Several Liability, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 628 (1988).
5
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2); Sasaki v. Class, 92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996);
Michael S. Kang, Comment, Don't Tell Juries About Statutory Damage Caps: The
Merits of Non-Disclosure, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 470 (1999).
6
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
7
Id. at §2000e-5(f)(4).
8
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 277, 279 (noting that “the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
attracted to the practice of employment law a new generation of lawyers, who approach
employment litigation like personal injury cases”).
9
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1) (2000).
10
Id. § 1981a(b)(3).
11
Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
12
Id, § 1981a(b)(3).
13
Combined compensatory and punitive damages cannot exceed $50,000 if the
employer has 100 or fewer employees, $100,000 for employers with 100 to 200
employees, $200,000 for employers with 200 to 500 employees, and $300,000 for
employers with more than 500 employees. See id. These numbers do not, however,
include any back pay that the jury awards.
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maximum.14 Caps are part of an overall movement to reform the tort
system, typically enacted by those who believe that the civil legal system
unfairly burdens society by paying out huge damage awards.15
In an interesting twist, Congress also expressly required that "the
court shall not inform the jury of the limitations [on damages]."16 Thus,
when called upon to measure damages in federal employment
discrimination cases, juries are expected to make their calculations
without knowing the ultimate limit that the caps enforce. The cap nondisclosure clause has been touted as a method of maintaining the
"integrity" of jury damages calculations: if informed of the caps, jurors
could purposely attempt to evade them or might be unconsciously biased
by the cap number.17 A variety of others, including courts and
commentators, have suggested that non-disclosure of damage caps, more
generally, should be the rule whenever a damage cap exists.18
This effort to preserve a jury's decision-making integrity by not
discussing the caps, however, forces courts and attorneys to conceal the
true state of the law and may exact a toll on public confidence in the
justice system. This paper explores the potential broad effects on the
jury system of the failure to disclose damage caps. In order to better
understand the context of disclosure versus non-disclosure, we first
examine the psychological effects that knowledge as opposed to
ignorance of the caps could have on jury decision-making processes and
damage awards. We then turn to an examination of the potential effects
that ignorance of the caps may have on perceptions of the legal process.
Ultimately, we conclude that jurors should be informed of the caps, both
to retain public confidence in the justice system and to give jurors
guidance in making the proper damages determination.
14

See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108(b) (2004); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 41.008 (Vernon 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2004).
15
Commentators suggest that such tort damage awards pass along great costs to
ordinary citizens. For example, Albert Yoon suggests that medical malpractice
produces an astronomical amount of costs – between $17 and $29 billion per year.
Albert Yoon, Damage Caps and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the South, 27 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 199, 200 (2001).
16
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2).
17
Kang, supra note MK1, at 470.
18
See id. at 478-79; see also American College of Trial Lawyers Committee on
Special Problems in the Administration of Justice, Report on Punitive Damages 15
(1989), available at: http://www.actl.com/PDFs/ReportOnPunitiveDamages.pdf;
Thomas v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 932 935 (Ark. 1984); State v. Bouras, 423 N.E,2d 741,
744 (Ind. App. 1981). But see Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1040 (1st Cir. 1996)
(finding no abuse of discretion in informing jurors about a Massachusetts state cap);
Vendrell v. School District, 360 P.2d 282, 292 (Or. 1961) (holding that jury must be
informed of state statutory limit on recovery against school district).

3

4

Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew Bodie

In Part I, we discuss the legislative history and judicial
interpretation of the cap non-disclosure clause, with an eye toward the
purpose behind the clause. In Part II, we discuss the potential effects of
disclosure and non-disclosure of the cap on jury damage awards in light
of psychological models of decision-making. In Part III, we discuss
potential effects of the concealed cap on perceptions of the justice
system, in particular examining procedural justice effects. Finally, in
Part IV, we argue for a system of disclosure that would use the caps to
guide jurors to the correct assessment of compensatory and punitive
damages.
I
NON-DISCLOSURE OF THE CAPS:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The 1991 Civil Rights Act is a many-faceted piece of legislation,
dealing with issues such as disparate impact claims,19 the “business
necessity” defense,20 and the right to a jury trial.21 The Act followed in
the wake of several Supreme Court decisions which had curtailed or
eliminated the rights and remedies available to victims of employment
discrimination.22 One of Congress’s primary goals was to reverse these
decisions directly by rewriting the civil rights statutes.23 However, an
additional purpose cited by the Act was to “provide appropriate remedies
for intentional discrimination and unlawful harassment in the
workplace.”24 The Act did this by allowing federal employment
discrimination plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages
for the first time.25 Punitive damages were only allowed when the
plaintiff demonstrated that the employer had engaged in the
19

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
See id. § 20003-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
21
Id. § 1981a(c)(1).
22
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Brief Introductory Analysis
of the Congressional Response to Judicial Interpretation, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 923,
924 (1993).
23
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1071, § 3. For example, the Act
specifically restores the definitions of such statutory terms as “business necessity” and
“job related” to the Court’s definitions as they existed prior to the decision in Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 105 Stat. 1071, § 3(2); see also id. §
3(4) (noting that another purpose is “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination”).
24
Id. § 3(1).
25
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000) (providing that “the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages”).
20
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discriminatory practice “with malice or reckless indifference” to the
plaintiff’s civil rights.26 In addition, the Act placed a limit on total
compensatory and punitive damages each plaintiff could receive.27 The
actual damage cap was based on the number of employees working for
the employer; the cap began at $50,000 for employers with less than 101
employees, and rose to $300,000 for employers with more than 500
employees.28 However, the Act specified that if the case was tried before
a jury (a new possibility created by the Act itself), and the plaintiff
sought compensatory or punitive damages, “the court shall not inform
the jury of the limitations described [above].”29
In order to dissect the purpose of this non-disclosure provision,
we begin below by discussing the legislative intent as manifested in the
legislative history of the provision. We then turn to how courts have
interpreted the provision, including its secondary effects.
A. Legislative History: Lost in the Shuffle
Like prior civil rights statutes, the 1991 Civil Rights Act was
passed only after taking a circuitous and controversial path.30 As noted
above, the 1988 Supreme Court term saw a number of controversial
decisions which cut back on the protections provided by federal
employment discrimination law, particularly Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. In response to these decisions, the United States House of
Representatives approved H.R. 4000, entitled the Civil Rights Act of
1990. The bill provided for substantial amendments of the federal law of
employment discrimination, including compensatory and punitive
damages for victims of intentional discrimination.31
During
congressional debate, the bill received criticism for its uncapped
damages provisions.32 An identical bill was proposed in the Senate and
26

Id. § 1981a(b)(1).
Id. § 1981a(b)(3). The Supreme Court has determined that “front pay” – namely,
money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and
reinstatement (or in lieu of reinstatement) – is not considered compensatory damages
and is thus not covered by the cap. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843, 852 (2001).
28
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The Act counted employees as those having worked
“in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.” Id.
29
Id. § 1981a(c)(2).
30
See Nicole L. Gueron, Note, An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Comparative
Procedural History of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 1964, and 1991, 104 YALE L.J.
1201, 1203 (1995) (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)).
31
H.R. Res. 4000 § 8 (101st Cong. 1990).
32
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II), at 71 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 757 ("You can show people all the studies that reveal that punitive
27
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was reported favorably out of committee.33 However, the bill was later
amended to add a $150,000 cap to compensatory and punitive
damages.34 The House and Senate passed the bill as amended, but
President Bush vetoed it.35 An attempt to override the veto failed by one
vote in the Senate.36
The House bill was resubmitted with minor changes in 1991 as
H.R. 1, the "Civil Rights and Women's Equity in Employment Act."37
According to the House Report, one of the bill’s two primary purposes of
the bill was "to strengthen existing protections and remedies available
under federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and
adequate compensation for victims of discrimination."38 Noting that
compensatory and punitive damages were available under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 for those who injured by intentional race discrimination, the report
noted that a "serious gap" existed for victims of intentional
discrimination on the basis of sex or religion.39 As did the 1990 bill,
H.R. 1 provided for uncapped compensatory and punitive damages.40
The House Report dismissed concerns about excessive verdicts by noting
that “juries are fully capable of determining whether an award of
damages is appropriate and if so, how large it must be to compensate the
plaintiff adequately and to deter future repetition of the prohibited
conduct.”41 The minority report, however, feared that uncapped
damages would lead to “a litigation generating machine” with “huge
awards” in the millions of dollars.42
damage awards in the past have not been for astronomical amounts ... But I can tell you
that it is small comfort if you are on the receiving end of a lawsuit where the allegation
is for say $3 or $4 million in punitive damages. That is your exposure. When somebody
files a lawsuit against you and they say, 'I am entitled to $10,000 in compensatory
damages and $5 million in punitive damages,' it will ruin your whole night's sleep."
(quoting Sen. Dale Bumpers)).
33
S. 2104 (101st Cong. 1990); S. Rep. No. 101-315 (1990).
34
See Gueron, supra note NG1, at 1203 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. H6810-13 (daily
ed. Aug. 2, 1990)).
35
See Gueron, supra note NG1, at 1203; Roger Clegg, An Introduction: A Brief
Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1994).
36
See Gueron, supra note NG1, at 1203; Clegg, supra note RC1, at 1465.
37
See H.R. 1 (102d Cong. January 3, 1991).
38
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 1 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694. The other purpose was to "respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions."
Id.
39
Id. at 24, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 717.
40
See H.R. 1 § 206 (102d Cong. January 3, 1991).
41
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 72 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
610.
42
H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (II) 143, 153 (May 17, 1991), reprinted in 1991
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H.R. 1 was amended in June 1991 to include a cap on punitive
damages, but compensatory damages remained uncapped.43 The House
approved the bill as amended, but the Senate never voted on the House
bill. Instead, the Senate passed its own version, which included both the
caps and the non-disclosure requirement. The House eventually
approved the Senate version, which President Bush signed into law. At
the signing, the President said the following about the caps contained in
the bill:
Another important source of the controversy that delayed
enactment of this legislation was a proposal to authorize jury
trials and punitive damages in cases arising under Title VII. S.
1745 adopts a compromise under which 'caps' have been placed
on the amount that juries may award in such cases. The
adoption of these limits on jury awards sets an important
precedent, and I hope to see this model followed as part of an
initiative to reform the Nation's tort system.44

Soon after the 1991 Civil Rights Act was signed into law, the "Equal
Remedies Act of 1991" was proposed in the Senate.45 The bill would
have removed the damage caps and the non-disclosure provision from
the code.46 However, it failed to pass.47
U.S.C.C.A.N. 672, 682.
43
137 Cong. Rec. H3922, H3924 (June 5, 1991). The cap limited punitive
damages to $150,000 or the sum of compensatory and equitable relief awarded
(whichever was greater).
44
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769 (Nov. 21, 1991).
45
S. 2062 (102d Cong. Nov. 26, 1991).
46
The committee report on the bill argued that the removal of the caps was
necessary to insure that women, religious minorities, and people with disabilities had
the same access to damages as racial and ethnic minorities. S. Rep. No. 102-286, at 5
(1992) ("Congress has created a system which values injuries suffered by women,
people with disabilities, and certain religious minorities less than the same injuries
suffered by racial or ethnic minorities."). According to the report, Congress accepted
the restrictions on damages "[i]n the interest of securing prompt passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, including the portion guaranteeing the right to damages," and "left
to 1992 the task of providing full, fair, and equal remedies for victims of
discrimination." Id. at 3. The committee minority, however, noted that the caps were
"part of the compromise on last year's civil rights legislation approved overwhelmingly
by the House of Representatives and the Senate.” Id. at 20. The minority argued that
capped damages represented "a significant expansion of the remedies" provided under
Title VII, and "unrestricted damages will lead to a litigation explosion [and will] result
in excessive damage awards that may be harmful to the financial health of the firm."
Id. at 21.
47
Two bills in the current Congress propose to eliminate the caps on compensatory
and punitive damages. See S. 2088 § 532 (108th Cong. Feb. 12, 2004); H.R. 3809 § 532
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The legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act contains little
specific discussion of the non-disclosure requirement. One reason may
be that the House Report was prepared for a bill that did not have
statutory damage caps, let alone a non-disclosure provision.48 However,
Senator John Danforth, one of the Senate bill's co-sponsors and reputedly
the driving force behind the final compromise bill,49 did provide this
discussion on jury discretion and knowledge of the caps:
Judges currently serve as an adequate check on the discretion
of juries to award damages. Consistent with the Seventh
Amendment, they can and do reduce awards which are
excessive in light of defendant's discriminatory conduct or a
plaintiff's resulting loss.
In addition, the bill specifically provides that the jury shall not
be informed of the existence or amount of the caps on damage
awards. Thus, no pressure, upward or downward, will be
exerted on the amount of jury awards by the existence of the
statutory limitations.50

The effects of the cap, according to Senator Danforth, thus appear to be
the potential for “pressure” to move damages “upward or downward”
from where they would have been without disclosure of the cap. Senator
Danforth does not explain why this pressure is to be avoided, or whether
damages are more likely to be moved upward or downward if the caps
were to be revealed.
There appears to have been little investigation by Congress into
the potential effects that hiding the caps would have, not only on jury
awards but also on jurors, judges, and attorneys. While the wisdom of
cap non-disclosure was lost in the shuffle of legislative compromise,
courts have been left to determine the scope and legal effect of the nondisclosure provision.
B. Judicial Interpretation: Integrity vs. Reallocation
While other provisions of the 1991 Act have received extensive
judicial exegesis, the cap non-disclosure provision has gotten only
limited attention. The non-disclosure provision has arisen in two
(108th Cong. Feb. 11, 2004).
48
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 (I) 64-65 (April 24, 1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 602-03.
49
See Clegg, supra note RC1, at 1469-70.
50
137 Cong. Rec. S15484 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (Sen. Danforth).
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contexts, one which involves the provision directly and the other which
involves an indirect consequence of the provision. These contexts are
considered below.
1. Direct context: Who can tell the jury what?
The text of the § 1981a non-disclosure provision states that “the
court shall not inform the jury” about the statutory cap.51 Read literally,
the provision would seem to prohibit only judges from explaining or
discussing the damages limitations. In Sasaki v. Class,52 however, the
Fourth Circuit held that attorneys were also prohibited from disclosing
the cap, or its effects, to jurors. The plaintiff in Sasaki brought suit
against the employer alleging sexual harassment under Title VII as well
as assault and battery under state tort law.53 During his closing
argument, plaintiff's counsel indicated to the jury that it could award
plaintiff "up to $50,000" in compensatory damages on the sexual
harassment claim, and "up to $500,000" on the state tort claim.54 While
counsel did not explicitly inform the jury about the caps, he did contrast
the two different claims, and he noted that on the state law "the law is
generous."55 Ultimately, the jury awarded plaintiff $61,250 in damages
on the sexual harassment claim56 and $150,000 on the state law claim.57
The Fourth Circuit determined that counsel had violated 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) by revealing the existence of the caps to the jury.58
The court acknowledged that the statute literally only prohibits the
"court" from informing the jury about the caps.59 However, it held that
"Congress clearly intended this restriction to prohibit anyone from
bringing the caps to the jury's attention."60 In discussing the purpose of
the provision, the court cited Senator Danforth's argument that the nondisclosure clause would eliminate the potential for "pressure, upward or
downward," on damages exerted by the caps.61 Noting that the caps
themselves were "enacted in apparent response to a concern about
51

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(2) (2000).
92 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 1996).
53
Id. at 235.
54
Id. at 235-36.
55
Id. at 236.
56
This amount fell below the cap, as plaintiff was awarded $11,250 in back pay,
which is not counted against the cap.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 236.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
52
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runaway verdicts," the court posited that the non-disclosure clause was
enacted "because 'legislators would likely fear that juries would award
the maximum or would otherwise adjust their awards if told of the
statutory limit.'"62 The court found strong reason to believe that the jury
had, in fact, tailored its damages verdict to circumvent the cap.
Although the acts covered by the state tort claims (unwanted touching)
were included within the sexual harassment claim, the jury awarded
almost three times the damages for that claim. Moreover, the jury
adhered to plaintiff’s counsel's suggested damages on the harassment
claim, not going above counsel's suggested maximum. The court found
that the jury "appears to have faithfully followed [plaintiff's] counsel's
directions" and "almost undoubtedly adjusted its award to account for the
federal cap."63 According to the court, "[t]he jury here likely reacted in
precisely the manner that Congress specifically feared, and which it
attempted to preclude through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1981a."64
Finding that counsel's statement was not harmless error, the court
remanded for a new trial on damages.65
In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit agreed with Sasaki's
conclusion that the cap non-disclosure clause extends to counsel as well
as the courts.66 However, the court found that counsel's reference was
harmless, because there was "no indication it had any effect on the jury's
award."67 The jury awarded $300,000 in punitive damages, the statutory
maximum, on plaintiff's gender discrimination claim – her only claim.
The court reasoned that the jury's knowledge of the caps did not change
its award:
From a practical standpoint, if the jury felt [defendant's]
conduct warranted less than $300,000 in punitive damages,
there is no reason to believe the mention of the limit on
punitive damages would have caused the jury to increase the
award.
If the jury believed that [defendant's] conduct
warranted more than $300,000, its knowledge of the cap did
nothing more than limit the jury's award to the lesser amount,
62

Id. at 237 (quoting Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension
Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REV. 345, 347 n.8 (1995)).
63
Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 243.
66
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. EMC Corp., 205 F.3d 1339 (Table),
2000 WL 191819 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2000). Interestingly, the reference to the caps was
made by an attorney for the EEOC. See id. at *8 (noting that EEOC counsel said to the
jury that $300,000 was "the most we can ask for" and "[i]f we could, we would ask for
a lot more").
67
Id. at *9.
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which the district court would have done in any event had the
jury returned a larger verdict.68

The dissenting judge disagreed, however:
An inescapable inherent risk exists that the jurors in this case
experienced pressure to award $300,000 in punitive damages,
instead of a lesser sum, in response to a misconceived
perception that Congress had foreordained that an employer of
[defendant's] size which satisfied the requisites for punitive
liability . . . should be punished in the amount of $300,000.69

As these divergent opinions shows, judges have intuitive – and
conflicting – notions about the effects that knowledge of the caps may
have, ranging from (1) the caps will have no effect to (2) jurors will
misunderstand the caps to (3) jurors will understand and circumvent the
caps.
Although courts have not agreed on the likely effects of the nondisclosure clause, there is agreement that the statutory caps do not affect
the amount of damages that a plaintiff may request from the jury, in part
because of the non-disclosure provision. In a number of cases,
defendants argued that plaintiffs’ prayers for relief should be struck by
the court because these prayers exceeded the statutorily-provided
damage limitations.70 However, courts have rejected this argument on
the basis on the non-disclosure provision. By forcing plaintiffs to limit
their claims to the statutory cap, a court “would in effect inform the jury
of the damage caps.”71 One court also suggested that forcing a plaintiff
to request only the capped amount would hinder the plaintiff’s ability to
demonstrate “the relative importance of her different damages claims,”
thereby impairing the plaintiff’s credibility.72 Instead, the courts have
68

Id. The court also noted that since the employer had failed to object at trial when
the statutory limit was mentioned, the employer had the burden of showing that
counsel’s conduct was “outrageous” or “egregious.” Id. at *8.
69
Id. at *15 (Krupansky, J. dissenting).
70
See, e.g., Johnson v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 926 F. Supp. 874, 876 (E.D.
Minn. 1996); Beam v. Concord Hospitality, Inc., 1996 WL 455020, at *5 (D. Kan. July
8, 1996); Solomon v. Godwin & Carlton, P.C., 898 F. Supp. 415, 416 (N.D. Tex. 1995);
Haltek v. Village of Park Forest, 864 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
71
Haltek, 864 F. Supp. at 807; see also Johnson, 926 F. Supp. at 876; Beam, 1996
WL 455020 at *6; Solomon, 898 F. Supp. at 417. It is unclear whether these courts
were suggesting that (1) plaintiffs would be entitled to explain their damages award,
thereby exposing the damage cap, or (2) jurors would intuit the presence of a cap by the
clipped nature of plaintiff’s prayer for relief.
72
Beam, 1996 WL 455020 at *6.
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stated that the proper procedure is to allow the plaintiff to request an
unlimited amount and then reduce the actual damages awarded if they
rise above the cap.73
2. Indirect effects: How should damages be apportioned between federal
and state claims?
Federal antidiscrimination protections such as Title VII are not
the only employment discrimination statutes available to employees.
States and localities also provide statutory antidiscrimination protections,
and these protections are not preempted by the federal provisions.74
States are even permitted to go beyond the federal provisions in their
coverage or relief.75 These provisions may seem superfluous if a
plaintiff is protected by a federal statute, but many of these statutes
provide for uncapped compensatory and/or punitive damages.76 Because
of this potential difference, a plaintiff may be entitled to significantly
lower relief under the federal statute than she is entitled to under the state
or local statute.
Given the potential for different relief for the same underlying
offense, judges and juries must grapple with how to apportion relief
between the capped federal statute and an uncapped state statute. The
Sasaki case provides an illustration of this. In Sasaki, the plaintiff
brought a federal claim (capped at $50,000) and a state tort claim
(capped at $500,000) based on the same underlying sexual harassment.77
The plaintiff’s attorney suggested to the jury that it award the maximum
amount under the federal claim, and then provide for further damages
under the state claim.78 And as the court noted, the jury appears to have
followed these instructions, awarding the statutory maximum on the
federal claim and $215,000 on the state claim.79 The Sasaki court
believed that the non-disclosure provision was designed to prevent such
73
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award structuring.80 According to the court, such award shifting was
what “Congress specifically feared” about cap awareness and thus why
Congress had included the non-disclosure provisions.81
The D.C. Circuit does not agree. In Martini v. Federal National
Mortgage Association,82 plaintiff brought harassment and retaliation
claims under both Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act. The district
court instructed the jury to award damages not only based on type of
claim (i.e., harassment or retaliation), but also based on statutory basis
(federal or local law). The jury awarded a total of nearly $7 million in
damages, including $3 million in punitive damages under the Title VII
claims and almost $2 million in compensatory and punitive on the D.C.
Human Rights claims.83 The district court then applied the $300,000 cap
to the Title VII damages. The D.C. Circuit, however, held that the
district court should have reallocated the excess Title VII damages to the
plaintiff's recovery under the D.C. Human Rights Act. Noting that the
district court had provided the same instructions for the federal and local
claims, the court held that the jury had no legal basis for distinguishing
between the statutes. Thus, for example, if the jury had awarded $2
million in punitives under the plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim and $1
million in punitives under the D.C. Human Rights retaliation claim, "the
most sensible inference is that the jury sought to impose a total of $3
million in punitive damages against [defendant] for retaliation."84 Thus,
while only $300,000 of those damages could be awarded under Title VII,
the district court should have reallocated the other $1.7 million to the
local claim. The court stated: "Were we not to treat damages under
federal and local law as fungible where the standards of liability are the
same, we would effectively limit the local jurisdiction's prerogative to
provide greater remedies for employment discrimination than those
Congress has afforded under Title VII."85
Most courts have held that district courts have discretion to
reallocate a total damages award between state and federal claims.86
80

Id. at 237.
Id.
82
178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
83
Id. at 1339.
84
Id. at 1349.
85
Id. at 1349-50. The court held that "[s]uch a result would violate Title VII's
express terms" that the Act was not intended to relieve defendants of liability under
state law. Id. at 1350.
86
See Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2002);
Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 (9th Cir.
2000); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997); Barrios v.
Kody Marine, Inc., 2000 WL 775067, at *4 (E.D. La. June 14, 2000); Luciano v. Olsten
81

13

14

Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Matthew Bodie

Courts have been willing to shuffle the monetary awards between claims
in order to maximize the plaintiff’s recovery, particularly if the jury has
jointly allocated the damages to the state and federal claims. For
example, in Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Products, Inc.,87
the plaintiff had brought both Title VII claims and claims under the
Washington State Law Against Discrimination.88 The jury found for the
plaintiff, awarding her backpay as well as $1 million in compensatory
damages and $8.6 million in punitive damages. The district court
allocated all of the $1 million compensatory damages to the state claim,
and all of the punitive damages to federal claim.89 This allocation
maximized plaintiff’s recovery, as under state law compensatory
damages were uncapped, but punitive damages were not permitted.90
The Ninth Circuit upheld this allocation. The court noted: “An
allocation that would serve to reduce lawfully awarded damages would
fail to respect the jury’s verdict and conflict with the purpose and intent
of one or both statutes.”91
Courts thus appear to have two distinct viewpoints on the 1991
Civil Rights Act damage caps and their non-disclosure to the jury. One
perspective prizes the jurors’ ignorance of the caps as a way of insuring
that the jury does its work without an understanding of the ultimate
outcome. If jurors were told of the cap, this perspective fears, they
would engage in gamesmanship with any non-capped damages and
circumvent the purpose of the caps. The other perspective views the
caps as a procedural rule that plays only a limited role within the entire
process. Judges are permitted to reallocate jurors’ damage awards in an
effort to give the greatest possible recovery to the plaintiff. It seems
clear that under this perspective there would be little problem with
informing jurors about the caps, if doing so were permitted. Informing
the jurors would obviate the need for any post hoc reallocation, as the
Corp., 912 F. Supp., 663, 675 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d on other grounds, 110 F.3d 210
(2d Cir. 1997); Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 851 (Iowa
2001). But see Oliver v. Cole Gift Centers, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113 (D. Conn.
2000) (applying federal cap to total recovery under federal and state law, but also
noting that plaintiff was “adequately compensated” by the capped amount).
87
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88
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Id. at 509-10.
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Id. at 510. See also Barrios, 2000 WL 775067 at *4 (arguing that when the jury
fails to allocate awards between claims, “it is most consistent with the intent of the jury
to permit Plaintiff to recover the maximum amount possible”); Channon, 629 N.W.2d
at 851 (holding that limiting damages to the federal cap amount “effectively limits
[Iowa’s] prerogative to provide greater remedies under our civil rights statute than those
available under Title VII”).

DAMAGE CAPS
jurors would be able to do this themselves. However, neither perspective
accounts for the possibility that knowledge of the caps will affect the
jurors’ calculations in ways other than simple reallocation. We
undertake an examination of these effects below.
II
EFFECTS OF CAPS ON JUROR DAMAGE DETERMINATIONS
From the sole comment in the legislative history about the
rationale for non-disclosure of the damage caps, it seems that the goal of
non-disclosure is to preserve the status quo – the integrity – of jury
deliberations.
The non-disclosure prevents pressure, “upward or
downward,” even while exerting control on the jury's ability to impose a
verdict above the cap amount. So, while the cap clearly signals an effort
to lower federal employment discrimination verdicts, the non-disclosure
has no such obvious directional purpose behind it.
By keeping juries ignorant of damage caps, legislators imply that
juries will be unable to compensate adequately for the effects of knowing
about the caps and will take the caps into account in making their
damages awards. In making this assumption, legislators appear to be
cognizant of the jurors as human decision-makers who may not always
follow a rational-actor model. Psychologists and others who study
decision-makinghave relied on both normative and descriptive models
to explain and envision the decision-making process; an examination of
decision-making models indicate that juries may well be influenced by
knowledge of the damage caps.
Normative models of decision-making show how the fully
rational decision-maker would optimally make decisions based on a
certain set of rational assumptions. The classic normative analysis is
“expected utility theory” – that is, rational decision makers will seek to
maximize their expected utility.92 In economic terms, the utility of each
possible outcome is calculated and then weighted by its probability.
Dominance is a primary principle of rational behavior that governs
decision-making under expected utility: simply put, if one option, choice
A, has more utility (e.g., is better) than another option, choice B, a
decision-maker will prefer and thus select choice A over choice B.93
Another principle, invariance, refers to the idea that varying descriptions
of a choice should not impact which choice is made.94 Whether one
92
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describes a choice in terms of awarding money to a plaintiff or taking it
from defendant, for instance, should not impact the decision maker, if the
monetary amounts are in fact identical in both alternatives.
A jury composed of “rational actors” would use utility theory to
determine the optimal damages award for a plaintiff. Knowledge of a
cap would not influence jurors’ assessments of appropriate damages,
except to eliminate any choice involving damages higher than the cap.
Take, for instance, a jury that does not know of a cap of $300,000 and
rationally weighs damages awards of $50,000, $80,000, and $110,000.
Using a utility theory approach, the jury might decide that $80,000 is the
most appropriate figure. With knowledge of the cap, this decision would
not change, because the caps do not change the utility or permissibility
of the available choices; rather, it merely limits the available choices to a
range that the jury already believes is appropriate.
Consider, however, a jury that is deliberating between $400,000,
$600,000 and $800,000. Under a normative approach to decisionmaking, the jury might arrive at $600,000. With knowledge of a
$300,000 cap, the jury will act rationally in awarding the maximum
damages figure of $300,000, because it will account for the fact that its
award would be higher but for the existence of the caps.95 Under a
utility theory approach, knowledge of the caps will not change juries'
assessments of damages awards, except that those awards that fall above
the cap range will all be considered as equal to the cap and each other.
Indeed, knowledge of the caps under this framework would only act to
maximize the efficiency of a rationally-acting jury: any debate or
discussion about varying awards over the cap would be unnecessary.
Presumably, then, since revealing the caps would make jury
deliberations faster and easier for a jury governed by expected utility
theory, Congress did not expect such a jury. And, in fact, although
normative principles have intuitive logical appeal, research has
consistently shown that human decision-makers do deviate significantly
from normative decision-making principles. Descriptive decisionmaking models, heuristics, and decision-making phenomena account for
human patterns of behavior that are not explained by normative
theories.96 An examination of these descriptive models, heuristics, and
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phenomena in light of knowledge of the caps shows how such
knowledge might affect jury verdicts.
As explained below, anchoring is perhaps the most robust and
widely discussed psychological phenomenon that would come into play
in jury damage deliberations. It is not clear, however, that anchoring is
the sole potential effect that revealing the caps would produce. Below,
we consider anchoring as well as several other decision-making
paradigms that could potentially result in altering the jury’s damages
award in light of knowledge of the caps. An examination of these
paradigms suggests that knowing of the caps could have both a
quantitative impact, affecting the ultimate numerical figure of the
damage award, either upward or downward, and a qualitative impact,
making a difference in how the jury arrives at its decision.
A. Anchoring and Adjustment
Psychological research has marshaled strong evidence for the
phenomena of anchoring and adjustment,97 in which the first number
with which a decision-maker is presented has a demonstrable effect on
that person's ultimate choice. In essence, the first number heard becomes
the place away from which any adjustment is made. Anchoring effects
are powerful, widespread, and have been found in a variety of contexts.
The source of the anchoring first number need not even be tied to any
rational source; indeed, the groundbreaking initial research on anchoring
demonstrated that anchoring effects were robust even when subjects
believed the first number to be randomly generated.98 In one example,
researchers found that first asking whether the average temperature in
San Francisco was above or below 558 degrees Fahrenheit resulted in
higher estimates of the actual average temperature than those given by
people who had not been asked the first question.99
In situations where jurors are advised by a judge of a damage
cap, empirical research has shown that there is a strong anchoring effect.
Juries make damage determinations by effectively moving "away from"
the stated cap to the degree they believe appropriate. Such anchoring
effects have been found in studies testing the impact of punitive damage
caps on mock jurors. As Michael Saks and his colleagues have found,
however, caps have differing effects on damage awards in low-severity,
97
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medium-severity, and high-severity injury settings.100 In his juror
simulation study, individuals were presented with one of three
hypothetical injury scenarios and asked to make a damage award. Some
individuals were advised of the existence of a damage cap of $250,000
“to provide [them] some guidance” in making their determinations;
others were given no guidance or other forms of guidance, including
average awards or ranges of most awards. In the low-severity case
scenario, the cap produced higher awards than either no information or
other forms of guidance; in the medium-severity case, the cap produced a
similar outcome to the no information condition, but a higher outcome
than other forms of guidance yielded. Finally, in the high-severity case,
the cap produced a lower average damage award than the control. Thus
the cap acted to inflate damage awards for low-severity injuries, but to
deflate damage awards for high-severity injuries.101
In a different juror simulation study, Jennifer Robbennolt and
Christina Studebaker tested for anchoring effects by holding constant the
severity of the injury and instead altering the amount of the damage
cap.102 They found that mock jurors’ damage awards were influenced by
knowledge of damage caps in both upwards and downward directions,
depending on the size of the caps. For example, in one experiment, the
mean damage award made by individuals who were not given any
information about a cap was approximately $5 million; those who were
told of a $100,000 cap awarded an average of $83,100, while those who
were told of a $50 million cap awarded an average of $9 million. Thus
high caps acted to inflate jury damage awards, while low caps acted to
deflate damage awards.103
Empirical research, then, reveals that damage caps do have the
potential to affect jury decision-making; however, it is not clear whether
anchoring effects around the § 1981a damage cap would act largely to
inflate or to depress damages awards. For example, consider a jury that,
if completely ignorant of the cap, might award $10,000,000 in damages
for what it thinks is particularly egregious conduct. If the jury learned of
the cap, and thus anchored at $300,000, they might award that maximum
or might adjust away to something less than $300,000, but their award
could certainly not be driven up due to knowledge of the cap. Thus, in
100
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the case of severe injury, anchoring effects could only act to deflate the
damage award. In contrast, consider a jury that would have otherwise
awarded $20,000 in damages for minor injury. If that jury were made
aware of the $300,000 cap, anchoring effects would likely pull the award
up higher than it would have been without the cap.104
Anchoring effects of a damage cap cannot, of course, be
considered in a vacuum; empirical research has repeatedly shown that
the plaintiff's demand for damages already acts as a psychological anchor
for jurors.105 Thus, the “pure” jury deliberations that the non-disclosure
provision was designed to protect are already “tainted” by what
plaintiff106 has asked for, if plaintiff is permitted to ask for damages in
the jurisdiction.107 Especially in light of the fact that there are no
restrictions on numbers proposed by plaintiffs' attorneys, concern over
the anchoring around the caps may be misguided. Indeed, forcing
attorneys to keep their demands in line with what caps permit would
create far more consistency in the anchoring that already occurs within
jury deliberation.108
Despite the empirical work on the effects of disclosed damage
caps on jury awards, it is difficult to predict what actual effects would
occur in the § 1981a context in the absence of empirical data regarding
the average size of a damage demand for federal employment
discrimination cases or the average size of damage awards. It is not even
clear what size employer is most often sued, meaning that the actual
monetary level of the cap that would be applied in most cases is not
104
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certain. For these reasons, the most likely directionality of any
anchoring effects that disclosure of the caps might produce is not clear.
However, these effects appear more likely to raise awards on the lower
end of the scale and lower awards on the upper end of the scale.
B. Scaling
In marked contrast to the invariance principle of expected utility
theory, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that the framing
of outcomes does have significant effects on individuals' choices.109
Scaling is one type of framing effect with the potential to impact jurors’
decision-making in light of the disclosure of a damage cap. Research
has shown that the framing of outcomes into differing "response scales,"
or ranges of possible response alternatives, can have a significant effect
on responses.110 For example, psychologist Norbert Schwarz and his
colleagues asked individuals to estimate how much television they
watched per day.111 When individuals were given a scale that went, at
half-hour intervals, from a low end of one half hour to a high end of
more than two and a half hours, only 16 percent of respondents said that
they watched more than two and a half hours of television per day.112
But when individuals were given a scale that ranged from “up to” two
and a half hours at the low end to more than four and a half hours at the
high end, 37.5 percent of respondents said that they watched more than
two and a half hours per day.113 Those using the lower value scale
estimated the average citizen’s television viewing time at 2.7 hours,
while those using the higher value scale estimated it at 3.2 hours.114
Essentially, scaling means that the presentation of a number or
numbers creates a mental scale that individuals use to calibrate choices.
Theorists have suggested that this result stems from people’s
fundamental need to make conversational sense out of information that
has been provided to them. Information is assumed to be provided
because it is relevant to the task at hand, and is assumed to be no more or
less than is needed to complete the task.115 Take, for instance, the case
109
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of television viewing: suppose one likes to think that one watches an
average (or better yet, slightly below average) amount of television, but
hasn’t really bothered to count the actual time spent watching. One will
assume that the response scale provided by the questioner reflects an
accurate assessment of the range of television viewing habits, from slight
to heavy. Thus a responder will choose a point towards the lower end of
the scale, regardless of what number is at that lower point. As Schwarz
shows, one would be less likely to choose the highest number offered,
because it seems so unlikely that the end point of the scale would
represent average or below average frequency.
Jurors presented with the damage cap may experience a scaling
effect, interpreting the maximum award amount as a measuring stick by
which to assess conduct. Making “conversational” sense out of the cap
might mean that Congress has told the jury that this is the largest amount
of financial damage that one can sustain from a federal employment
discrimination violation – and, in turn, if this is the largest amount of
damage, then it must correspond to the most severe injury. That is, a
damage cap is a message from Congress (or the judge) to the jury that
says that the worst conduct is to be redressed by damages in the amount
of the cap. It logically follows that less egregious conduct should be
remedied by lower sums.
For example, knowledge that the cap for damages is $300,000
may prompt jurors to imagine that $100,000 appropriately compensates a
lesser degree of injury, $200,000 compensates an intermediate degree of
injury, and $300,000 compensates the highest degree of injury. Without
knowledge of the caps, juries may use the plaintiffs' requests for
damages as the marker of a response scale: for instance, if plaintiff
alleges egregious conduct and asks for $10,000,000, a jury may decide
that the conduct is only moderately severe, and award $5,000,000; that
same jury faced with a plaintiff asking for $1,000,000 might award
persuasively argues that research subjects read and process a survey or questionnaire as
part of a normal conversation between researcher and subject, using Gricean maxims of
quality, quantity, relation and manner. Thus research questions and statements will be
assumed to provide no more or less information than necessary to answer the question;
similarly, they will be assumed accurate and truthful. Participants will assume that
information provided is in some way relevant to the task, and finally, they will assume
information is provided in a way that is meant to be understood. See Norbert Schwarz,
Judgment in a Social Context: Biases, Shortcomings, and the Logic of Conversation, in
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$500,000. Jurors might, too, disregard plaintiffs' requests as selfinterested and create their own scales for damages using other criteria.
There is still an open question, as with anchoring, as to the most
likely directionality of any scaling effects on verdicts. Take a case
where the jury believes that the injury is intermediate: if their award
without disclosure of the caps would have been $50,000, then scaling
effects from the disclosure of the caps might raise their award to
$200,000. But if the jury would have awarded $1,000,000 for an
intermediate injury, then scaling would act to lower it, even more than
the mere cap at $300,000 would do. The findings of Saks and his
colleagues116 are, in fact, largely consistent with scaling effects, and
suggest that scaling effects could increase the damage awards for lower
injury cases, but further empirical research is needed to assess how
scaling effects might function.
C. Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
Prospect theory posits that people do not assess utility per se
when making a decision; rather, they evaluate their options based on the
resulting gain or loss from a starting reference point.117 Prospect theory
was expressly developed to explain research findings that showed that
individuals consistently make decisions that do not conform to principles
of expected utility theory.118 Prospect theory relies heavily on the
concept that individuals are deeply affected by how decisions are
framed. Losses “loom” larger than gains, and decision-makers will take
greater risk to avoid a loss than they would to reap a similar gain – that
is, they are loss averse.119
Without knowledge of a damage cap, a jury is likely to perceive
any amount that it awards plaintiff as a gain for the plaintiff.120 But in
light of the existence of a damage cap, jurors may perceive any award
that is less than the cap as a loss, and wouldbe more averse to awarding
a number below the cap than they would have otherwise been if ignorant
of the cap. Any loss aversion effects due to knowledge of the damage
116
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caps, then, would exert upward pressure on damage awards.
A related psychological phenomenon, the "endowment effect,"121
similarly suggests that knowledge of the caps will produce higher awards
than ignorance of the caps. Under the endowment effect, people value
more highly the things that they already possess than they would value
those same things if they had to acquire them ab initio. Jurors learning
of the cap may perceive it as consonant with a damages award itself.
Mentally perceiving the damage limit as a damage award that has
already been awarded to the plaintiff could result in framing effects that
code any award under the cap as a loss. If such jurors identify with the
plaintiff and perceive a lesser award as "giving up" money, they may act
to prevent this from happening.
The status quo bias, another psychological phenomenon based
largely on the principle of loss aversion, may similarly exert upward
pressure on the average damage award. The status quo bias is a
phenomenon whereby people remain at the status quo because
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than advantages.122 For this
reason, jurors may latch on to the cap amount as the status quo and be
reluctant to award any amount that is lower than the cap.
Both the endowment effect and the status quo bias seem more
likely to occur with a damage cap than with a plaintiff’s request for
damages, because jurors are likely to perceive the damages request as an
aspiration by plaintiff, in contrast to an endowment or pronouncement by
the legislature or court. Theoretically, loss aversion effects are likely to
increase damage awards in low or moderate-severity cases, where juries
would otherwise have awarded damages in an amount below the cap, but
would not have any impact on damage awards for very severe cases, in
which juries would likely have awarded damages above the cap. This is
largely consistent with the empirical findings of Saks and his colleagues,
who found that low-severity cases received higher damages when jurors
knew of a cap.123
D. Evasion and Reactance
Knowledge of the existence of caps might simply cause jurors,
acting rationally, to reapportion their damages award among the different
claims brought by plaintiff. For example, assume that jurors arrive at a
121
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damages figure that they believe appropriately responds to the particular
needs of a plaintiff and the behavior of a defendant. Knowledge of a cap
that is less than that figure may prompt jurors to be creative in allocating
damages to various claims, in essence evading the cap in order to
provide plaintiff with what they believe is the proper amount of
damages.
The court in Sasaki believed just such an evasion had taken place
when the jury awarded $61,250 in damages under the Title VII claim and
$150,000 in damages under the state tort claim. Had the jury not known
about the cap, it might have allocated all of its damages to the sexual
harassment claim, or at least might have divided the damages 50/50
between the claims. Knowledge of the cap allowed the jury to provide a
larger overall damages award for plaintiff's federal and state claims.
Thus disclosure of the caps may make a rationally acting jury divide its
award in a different manner than it otherwise might have done; however,
the total damage award would not differ from what would have been
awarded had there been no caps at all. If juries were able to evade the
Congressional caps, average total damage awards would be presumably
be higher.
Might the jurors act not just to evade the restrictions of the caps,
but as part of a response pattern expressly to those restrictions? The
psychological theory of reactance posits that when individuals feel that
their behavior options have been limited, they react by becoming
psychologically aroused.124 Possible effects include increased attraction
to the forbidden option. Under this theory, juries might not merely
reallocate damages into another category in order to evade the restriction
on their behavior; the restriction on their damage-awarding behavior
might even propel them to find a high monetary award more appealing
than they would have without knowledge of a cap.125 Reactance effects
would, then, exert upward pressure on overall damage awards.
In a process similar to reactance, jurors might experience reactive
devaluation based on revelation of the caps by the judge or attorneys.
Reactive devaluation describes the phenomenon in which individuals
assess the appeal of a choice based on the identity of the entity proposing
the choice. If an individual perceives a choice as stemming from an
124
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adversary, the choice is less appealing than the same choice would be
coming from an ally.126 For example, in the 1980’s, students who heard
the same proposal about nuclear disarmament rated it more favorably
when the source was said to be the United States than when the source
was said to be the Soviet Union.127
In the case of caps, if the jury perceives the court and or Congress
as limiting its power – and thus as an opposing party to it – the jury may
reactively devalue a damage cap so that it no longer seems adequate to
compensate a plaintiff fully for the harm suffered. That is, the jury will
perceive that if the court and Congress believe that a cap figure is
sufficient to compensate plaintiff, then it certainly cannot be adequate to
compensate plaintiff. Similar to the process of reactance, the jury may
then not only award the maximum permitted by the cap, but may be
spurred on to award more money for any other available claim. In
absence of disclosure of the caps, jurors are unlikely to feel themselves
in opposition to the plaintiff once they have decided on defendant's
liability, making it far less likely that the figure proposed by a plaintiff
will produce reactive devaluation.
There is currently no empirical data that supports a reactance or
reactive devaluation effect in jury damage awards. A study by Greene et
al.128 found that damage awards made by mock jurors who were told of a
cap on punitive damages but were able to award uncapped compensatory
damages did not differ significantly from damage awards made by mock
jurors who were able to award unlimited punitive and compensatory
damages. An earlier study by Jennifer Robbennolt and Christina
Studebaker129 yielded similar results. Although research findings do not
support a finding of reactance or reactive devaluation by juries in
response to damage caps, it is not clear that jurors would never have such
a reaction to any legislative cap in any legal context. Several important
differences between the studies that have been performed to date and the
§ 1981a context include, for example, the § 1981a limit on both punitive
and compensatory damages, so that in essence all non-equitable130
recovery under federal civil rights law is limited by the caps.
Additionally, there has not yet been a study that has tested for reactance
126
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or reactive devaluation effects in a group “jury” setting rather than
among individual mock jurors.131
E. Availability
Informing juries of a cap on damages may produce an availability
effect. The damage cap number will be more salient, or available to the
jury, than any other potential damage award. Availability is a decisionmaking heuristic in which decision-makers assess the likelihood of an
event by how easily a similar event can be brought to mind.132 For
example, research has shown that individuals believe it is more likely
that one would be killed by a shark attack than by falling airplane
parts.133 Certainly, people have heard more about shark attacks than they
have about deaths due to falling airplane parts. In truth, however, the
odds of death from a shark attack are far lower than the odds of death
from falling airplane parts. Theorists have explained this result by
noting that examples of shark attacks are far more mentally available to
the average person than examples of people being hit by falling pieces of
an airplane.
In making their determination of damages, jurors could more
easily bring the cap number to mind than other amounts of damage
awards. Of course, if the jury would have found damages in an amount
over the cap without knowledge of the cap, then availability will not
affect the ultimate outcome, but if a jury would have awarded fewer
damages, the availability of the cap number may prompt jurors to arrive
at a higher damages figure. In essence, availability suggests that jurors,
trying to think up a damages award, will be asking themselves, “What
does a damage award look like?” and will answer, “It looks like [the
figure provided by the court as a cap].” Any availability effect of the cap
may also depend on what other damage award numbers are present in
jurors’ minds. For example, jurors may know of damage awards in other
cases,134 or may be aware of both plaintiff and defendant’s suggestions
of appropriate damage awards.
131
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F. Satisficing
Knowledge of damage caps may affect not just the bottom line
but also the “quality” of the jury’s damage decision. Although empirical
work has indicated that juries do not make decisions according to
expected utility theory, the justice system is premised on an assumption
that juries do make an effort to reach good decisions. However,
knowledge of a cap may encourage the use of certain heuristics, or
“shortcuts” to decision-making, that psychologists and other researchers
have identified as being used by individual decision-makers in realworld decision-making.
For instance, the satisficing heuristic describes a decision-making
process in which a decision-maker sets a minimum value that attributes
of any alternative must meet. The decision-maker considers alternatives
one by one, in whatever order they happen to be presented. The first
alternative in which each attribute meets the decision-maker’s minimum
is selected. Regardless of how many additional alternatives remain to be
examined, the decision-maker then stops and does not examine any other
alternatives.135
In juror deliberations, a damage cap could encourage a jury to
choose a satisficing heuristic. The range of damage awards is far
narrower with a cap; jurors might perceive the cap as the criteria which
their award must meet. Thus, as soon as one juror proposed a damages
award that fell under the cap, jurors would accept that number without
considering other alternatives. For example, a juror might propose
$250,000 in damages; in light of the cap, other jurors would agree to the
proposal to save time and effort, even though, without knowledge of a
cap, jurors might have weighed a number of options and arrived at a
different decision. There has not been any empirical research to date that
examines whether juries may use a satisficing process in their
deliberations.
G. Overall Effects of Disclosure Versus Non-Disclosure
Psychological research, then, makes clear that the juries’
135
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decision-making processes, as well as ultimate awards, will likely differ
if jurors are informed of the damage caps. Both theoretical work and
empirical research seem to indicate that disclosure of the caps would
tend to raise average awards in low-severity injury cases, but would tend
to lower average awards for high-severity injury cases. However, given
the complexities involved in assessing severity levels in individual,
unique cases,136 it is still largely unclear whether the bulk of awards
would be pressured upward or downward by the disclosure of the caps.
Nonetheless, it is clear that non-disclosure does act as a buffer,
preventing the caps from affecting the jury’s damage award decisionmaking process. Thus the caps do act to protect the integrity of the
jury’s damage award decision-making process.137 Below, however, we
explore a graver consequence of non-disclosure – a threat to the integrity
of the jury system as a whole.
III
THE EFFECTS OF NON-DISCLOSURE ON THE JURY SYSTEM
To date, what little systematic attention that has been paid to the
non-disclosure of damage caps has focused on the potential effects that
disclosure versus non-disclosure might have on jury damages
deliberations and calculations. Above, we offer a more comprehensive
examination of these effects, suggesting ways in which several
psychological principles might exert upward or downward pressure on
the jurors' ultimate verdicts as well as alter the quality of the decisionmaking process itself. There has, however, been no attention given to
the (more pernicious) potential effects of non-disclosure of the caps on
the judicial process itself. The non-disclosure has the potential to trigger
a loss of confidence and trust in the jury system, as well as causing
inefficiencies in the system stemming from effects on attorney and juror
behavior. These effects are discussed below.
A. The Threat to the Jury as a Procedurally Just System
The jury plays a crucial political role in the United States. It has
been argued that average citizens follow the law not because of the threat
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of punishment but because the law is perceived as legitimate.138 Juries
are an important element of the legitimacy of the legal system.139
Theorists have also identified another important function of the jury: the
socializing function in which the jury both allows regular citizens to
participate in the legal process as well as educating citizens about that
process.140 Thus juries play a political role both on a macro and a microlevel, serving as a crucial element of a legitimate democratic government
and engaging average citizens in the political system.
Psychological research has identified the principle of procedural
justice as an important element of individuals’ perceptions and opinions
of legal systems and structures. In the 1970s, a growing dissatisfaction
with the American legal system helped to spawn research into procedural
justice.141 Thibaut and Walker suggested that a focus on procedural
justice – in essence, on the fairness of process – might offer a solution to
problems such as widespread non-compliance with court orders,
especially in the child custody domain.142 The fundamental premise of
procedural justice literature is that individuals are not solely motivated
by the objective quality of the outcome or the subjective fairness of the
outcome. Rather, the procedural justice literature suggests that the
justice process itself is vital to individuals’ experiences – people are
more satisfied with outcomes, view them as more favorable, and are
more willing to voluntary comply with third-party decisions, when they
perceive the process by which the outcomes were achieved as fair.143
Procedural justice effects have been found in a variety of legal
contexts, including with juries,144 with police,145 with a mediator,146 and
with other government authorities.147 Theorists have suggested that
assessments of procedural justice are vital to the acceptance of decisions
by legal authorities and, indeed, to the continued preservation of
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society.148 Procedural justice plays a powerful role in shaping trust in
authorities and perceptions of legitimacy of authorities. People comply
with the law, trust the law, and respect the law due in large measure to
their perceptions that the law is a system of fair procedures. Trust and
reliance in the jury system are important to the continued respect for the
justice system as a whole, and trust and reliance can be affected by the
perception that the jury system is a fair one.149 Concealing damage caps
from the jury has the potential to suggest a procedurally unfair system:
players as diverse as the plaintiff, defendant, attorneys, jurors, and the
public at large may experience procedural justice effects from a rule that
prevents jurors from learning of damage caps.
1. Effects on Parties to the Dispute
People take their disputes to the legal system not just to win but
in order to bring a fair process to bear on the resolution of their case.
How might the concealment of a damage cap150 affect parties’
perceptions that the legal process is fair? Procedural justice literature
suggests that the process by which a dispute is resolved has a distinct
impact on the parties’ satisfaction with the resolution, over and above the
distributive – that is, typically, the monetary – outcome. As we have
discussed in Part II supra, disclosure of the cap would likely have some
impact on the monetary award made by the jury, but it is not clear
whether the award would systematically rise or fall due to disclosure –
meaning that it is not clear whether plaintiffs or defendants would
typically benefit from disclosure of the cap. But procedural justice
literature suggests that all parties, even the “winners,” are less satisfied
with the outcome when it is arrived at through an unfair process.151 For
this reason, both plaintiffs and defendants may be less satisfied with the
jury verdict.
Although both parties may assess the process less favorably if it
is not procedurally fair, the paradigmatic case in which a procedural
justice effect is most likely is the case in which a jury awards plaintiff
damages higher than the cap amount. Consider, for example, a case
similar to Passatino, discussed supra Part I, in which an $8,600,000
punitive damages award was reduced to $300,000 pursuant to the §
1981a damage caps. From a psychological perspective, a number of the
148
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heuristics and biases that we discussed in Part II, supra, come into play
in how plaintiffs would assess this monetary result. First, because
plaintiffs hear the larger verdict first (even if they already know, as is
likely, of the existence of the caps), they will frame the lower award as a
loss of the difference, rather than as a gain of the cap amount. This
means that the cap “takes away” money that the jury has awarded them
and to which they may feel entitled. Similarly, the jury’s verdict acts as
an anchor when plaintiffs assess what their case is “worth”: plaintiffs
can contrast the cap amount with the damages award and are more likely
to arrive at an unfavorable conclusion about the distributive fairness of
their outcome.
But aside from the perception that the actual damages award is
unfair, plaintiffs are also likely to be more upset and angry at the legal
process when a jury awards them one amount and the judge must enforce
a law that caps that amount. Procedurally, this is a very different
experience than the one plaintiffs would experience if jurors were told up
front that there was a cap on recovery. In that case, juries would never
make such an inflated award in the first place, and plaintiffs would not
experience any sense of either distributive or procedural unfairness
stemming from the jury’s actions in light of the cap. Any sense of
procedural (or distributive) unfairness would have to stem from
Congress’s actions in capping the damages, rather than from – as in the
case of concealment – the legal system that permitted a “true”
assessment of their damages but only gave them some, possibly small,152
percentage of that award.
2. Effects on Attorneys
Lawyers, too, may arrive at the conclusion that the system is not
procedurally fair – and lawyers’ continued respect for legal authorities
and institutions is an important component of the functioning of the legal
system as a whole. In particular, courts have interpreted Title VII’s nondisclosure requirement to prevent attorneys as well as the court itself
from informing juries of the caps. In jurisdictions that permit attorneys
to request specific amounts of damages, this has the potential to force
attorneys to engage in a “courthouse charade” in which they must
explicitly pretend that the caps do not exist.
Although the text of § 1981a(c)(2) simply requires that "the court
shall not inform the jury of the limitations" imposed by the caps, in both
152
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Sasaki and EMC plaintiff's counsel, not the court, was accused of
violating the non-disclosure provision. Moreover, counsel did not even
specifically mention the caps; instead, they said that jurors could award
"up to $50,000" or "a maximum of $300,000." But the courts held that
the reference to a limit on damages was a violation of the non-disclosure
cap.
The reasonable import of these cases, then, is that plaintiff's
counsel cannot mention any limit on damages. But could, or should,
counsel limit its request to the amount of the caps? What if plaintiff's
counsel in Sasaki had instead told the jury, "We are asking you to award
$50,000 on the harassment claim and $150,000 on the tort claim"? Such
a pitch has no reference to any limits imposed on damages. Jurors might
wonder why plaintiff had structured her request that way, but they would
not have been "inform[ed]" of the cap. Although not ruling on this issue,
the Fourth Circuit noted that "[s]pecifically requesting the cap amount
without explicitly mentioning the cap would violate the spirit (if not the
letter) of the law."153
If counsel cannot even tailor their damage requests to comply
with the law, then § 1981a(c)(2) goes beyond merely placing a restriction
on what courts and counsel can say. Instead, the law has effectively coopted counsel into affirmatively perpetuating the charade that the caps do
not exist. In interpreting the cap non-disclosure clause, the courts seem
to be calling on counsel to perform a kabuki-style theater, where
plaintiffs' attorneys ask for some amount of damages in excess of the
caps while knowing they can get no more than the cap. This puts
plaintiffs' attorneys in a quandary as they approach the task of
determining their damage demand.
Moreover, at least according to the D.C. Circuit, a jury is entitled
to allocate damages to a state or local law claim, and thus "evade" the
cap, if the state or local law claim has no restriction on damages. A
plaintiff's attorney may conceivably want to discuss this possibility with
the jury, in order to explain how the jury must structure its award to
achieve the desired result. However, since such an explanation would at
least imply the existence of a cap, under Sasaki and EMC it would be
impermissible. Without information about the caps, jurors would not be
in a position to express their preferences about damages in light of the
damages restrictions. Thus, as in Martini, the court would be left to
reconstruct juror preferences after the fact.
In essence, attorneys are co-opted by statute and case law into
misleading the jury, as well as setting wildly inappropriate expectations
153
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for their own clients, by suggesting damage amounts that are far in
excess of what the jury award could ultimately be. This means that
lawyers are required to engage in deception and increases their
perception that they are engaged in an untrustworthy system; this seems
likely to lower lawyers’ respect for the integrity of the legal process.
Additionally, plaintiffs’ attorneys may suffer the same effects that
plaintiffs themselves experience, in that a procedure that allows for the
jury to pronounce some “value” of a case but only permits recovery of
some fraction thereof may seem patently unfair, in a way that would not
occur if juries knew of the cap at the outset.154
3. Effects on Jurors
Jurors’ perceptions of the fairness of the jury system, too, may
suffer from non-disclosure of the cap. Imagine yourself as a juror
considering a Title VII claim. After hearing testimony about extensive,
pervasive, and egregious discrimination at a Fortune 500 company, you
have determined that the defendant is liable for intentional
discrimination. The discrimination reached the highest levels of the
company, and management showed no interest in redressing or
preventing discrimination in the future. After determining that the
company intentionally violated federal law,155 you and the other jurors
carefully evaluate the evidence to determine the proper level of damages.
Based on the pain and suffering caused to the plaintiff, the jury awards
$500,000 in compensatory damages, and levels a $1 million punitive
award based on the company's systemic misconduct. However, after
spending hours to arrive at this damages assessment, you learn that the
$1.5 million award will be reduced to $300,000 and that, in fact, it would
be impossible for plaintiff to receive more that $300,000 no matter what
the award.
While caps themselves may frustrate a jury that feels that the
injury with which it is confronted merits a greater payout, we posit that it
is much more damaging to confidence in the jury system to hide the
existence of those caps. While little attention has been paid to this
concern, we believe it is a significant side effect of a non-disclosure
system. It may be that jurors would not ever learn about the imposition
of the cap; however, even if they do not learn about it in the courtroom,
they could still find out in the courthouse or in the press.156 If jurors
154
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become aware of the damage cap’s effect on their verdict, their belief in
the procedural justice of the jury system may be eroded.
Jurors involved in the process may reach the conclusion that the
process that they have participated in is not procedurally fair with respect
to their contribution. Jury duty is a rare moment in which ordinary
citizens are bound up with the legal system; research has shown that the
experience of jury duty typically boosts jurors’ positive attitude toward
jury service and their confidence in the jury system.157 Concealment of
the cap has the potential to add a component to jury service that would
worsen jurors’ attitudes toward jury service and decrease their
confidence in the system.
Although the number of citizens who serve as jurors at any one
time is a small percentage of the whole population, in the aggregate a
substantial portion of the population will at some point serve on a jury.158
Additionally, jurors communicate their experience on a jury to others so
that their experiences, negative or positive, have the potential for a ripple
effect in the community.159 While it is true that an even smaller
percentage of those who actually do serve on a jury will serve on a jury
that hears a Title VII or other federal employment discrimination case,
there are nonetheless a class of citizens who will have direct experience
with the concealed damage cap.160
Concealing the damage cap could affect involved jurors’
assessment of procedural justice in several ways. In particular, if the
jury awards an amount higher than the damage caps, the rejection of that
award can be damaging to the procedural justice assessments of the jury.
Researchers have suggested that voice is an important antecedent of
procedural justice assessments.161 When individuals feel that they have
had the opportunity to express themselves and to be heard, they are more
likely to feel that the process is a fair one.162 One could conceive of a
damages award as an expression by the jury of its views with respect to a
the caps. See, e.g., GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note GB1, at 178; Robbennolt &
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defendant’s behavior. If the jury is thwarted in expressing itself through
its damage award, jury members may conclude that the process is not a
fair one.163 The jury members are likely to feel that their voices have not
been heard or respected, in a way that is unlikely if they know before
their deliberations that they are limited in the amount they may award.
Research has also suggested that the degree of control that
individuals have in any given decision-making process plays an
important role in whether they feel that the process is fair.164 In the
context of the jury, jurors’ ultimate control over the damages award is
not affected by the concealment of the cap, but by the cap itself.
Nonetheless, concealing the cap changes the jury’s expectations of its
own role, so that while a jury aware of the cap might feel that it had full
control over the damages award within the confines of the cap, a jury
that did not know of the cap would feel that it had no control if it
awarded damages in an amount that was summarily rejected due to the
imposition of the cap.
4.

Systemic Effects

Regardless of the individual experiences of people directly
involved in a particular case, the structural design of a system in which
jurors are purposely misled and their views are discarded may have
important procedural justice effects as well. Particularly since Title VII
deals with race and sex discrimination, plaintiffs, jurors, and society at
large could not be blamed for feeling that the system is "fixed" against
women and minorities after the cap swoops in from out of nowhere to
rescue defendants. In light of public perceptions that the justice system
is systematically biased against racial and ethnic minorities,165 the cap
non-disclosure clause is only likely to make a bad situation worse. More
broadly, an understanding on the part of the general public that jury
damage awards are being made in a vacuum of information about caps
could suggest not only that the decision-making process in Title VII
cases is unfair but that the government does not trust ordinary citizens
with important information. This directly undermines the legitimacy of
the jury system and citizens’ trust in authority.
163
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B. The Potential for Flawed Decision-making

Proponents of cap non-disclosure argue that knowledge of the
caps would taint juror calculations about the damages. However, juror
ignorance about the caps also has the potential to distort the jurors’ true
intentions for appropriate relief. In cases involving both state and federal
employment claims, different legal regimes may govern the available
awards that juries may choose. If courts are interested in determining
what jurors feel is appropriate in light of these different regimes, it
would be easiest simply to explain the different systems and have the
jurors arrive at the appropriate award. Disclosure would alleviate the
need for courts such as Martini166 to reallocate damages in an effort to
achieve the jury’s intended award. Instead, juries could work within the
permitted framework to allocate damages according to their conception
of justice.167
Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in Sasaki168 might object to
giving the jurors the opportunity to game the system by, for example,
overallocating damages to the uncapped state law claim. However, what
does the concept of “overallocation” mean in this context? The § 1981a
damage caps do not preempt the ability of states to allow much greater
damages for the same underlying injury.169 If jurors unsuspectingly
allocate damages to the capped federal claim rather than the uncapped
state or local claim, they have essentially been tricked into letting the
federal cap dictate the scope of relief. Hiding the effect of the caps, and
then failing to reallocate damages to the uncapped claims, is
disrespectful not only of the jury’s decision but also state law.170 The
best solution is to simply to inform the jury about the relevant damages
limitations and then let the jurors allocate between claims as they deem
proper.171
166
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If the state law claim was not contiguous with the Title VII claim but instead
covered a different kind of offense, the court could strike down the damages if it felt the
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C. Inefficiencies of Non-Disclosure
Requiring jurors to be ignorant of the caps imposes inefficiencies
on the jurors' process for calculating damages. If jurors who are unaware
of the cap know that they wish to award damages greater than the cap,
but are unsure about what size their award should be, they may waste
considerable time on an essentially moot decision. For example,
supposing that jurors has found defendant liable in a Title VII
harassment case, and are uncertain whether to award $500,000 or $1
million in punitive damages. Jurors may waste considerable time and
effort in making this decision, but the outcome will be an award of
$300,000 regardless.
A traditional complaint about jury service is that it has the
potential to waste citizens’ time: jury service takes people away from
their work and other responsibilities and can consist of long periods of
time spent waiting to be empanelled or questioned by attorneys.172 The
additional time spent by jurors working out a damages award that, in any
event, will be struck down to the level of the cap can only exacerbate
jurors’ perception that the judicial system wastes their time. This
inefficiency has the potential effect of frustrating the jury system’s
overall efficiency by providing additional incentives for citizens to evade
jury service.
Generally, society desires its citizens to be fully aware of the
law.173 But the cap non-disclosure requirement promotes, indeed,
mandates, citizen ignorance about the law. Although most jurors are
most likely unaware of the damage caps, should jurors who do know
about the caps be excluded from Title VII juries? It would seem to
follow from Sasaki that jurors should not be informed of the caps, even
by other members of the jury.174 This poses a bit of a paradox: how
could the court or attorneys discover which jurors had such knowledge
and should be excluded without themselves revealing in some way that
such caps exist? And, if knowledgeable jurors are thus excluded, the
pool of potential Title VII jurors becomes tilted towards those jurors who
are less informed about the law.
juror were impermissibly shifting Title VII damages to the (less serious) state law
violation. The Sasaki case might be one such example. See Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237
(stating that the jury “award[ed] a significantly larger amount of damages for the ‘lesser
included’ state conduct and injury”).
172
See Seidman Diamond, supra note SD1, at 286.
173
Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 194-96 (1998) (noting the “traditional rule that
ignorance of the law is no excuse”).
174
Sasaki, 92 F.3d at 237.
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In a related vein, jurors who have some knowledge of the law
may be incorrect in their understandings: for example, a jury member
might believe that the cap is much lower or higher than it really is, and
reveal that misinformation to the rest of the jury.175 This could skew the
jury’s decision-making far more than an explanation by the judge of the
relevant cap. For this reason, too, preventing the court from informing
juries about the caps is problematic. In the absence of revealing the
caps, there is no consistency among juries with respect to the information
they possess about damage awards.
We do not suggest here that it is never appropriate to prevent
some individuals from serving, or to conceal some information from the
jury. It is undoubtedly true that juries should be as unbiased as possible,
and jurors are therefore excluded from service for all manner of valid
reasons.176 Similarly, a host of possible data can be kept from the jury:
past criminal records and unduly prejudicial material, for example. In
any of these cases, one might raise the concern that keeping the jurors in
ignorance has a detrimental effect on procedural justice assessments.
However, in each case, concerns about procedural justice must be
weighed against the countervailing justice concerns that would be raised
by allowing jurors access to the information. For example, allowing
jurors to see particularly grisly photos of a crime scene may taint the
fairness of the trial a defendant receives; the fairness concerns in
preventing the jury from seeing the photos outweighs the fairness
concerns of jurors’ access to information. Indeed, jurors themselves
might even agree, ex post, that this information could have prevented
them from making a fair and accurate, unbiased determination of the
facts. Additionally, most of the other information that is kept from juries
is done so in a fact-finding context. Here, jurors are asked not to
determine the facts but to arrive at a damages award – there is no “truth”
to discover, but rather, a decision to be made by the jury about the worth
of the case. There is no compelling countervailing reason for this
enforced ignorance that outweighs its negative procedural justice effects.
IV
CAP DISCLOSURE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT JUROR DISCRETION
The disclosure or non-disclosure of damage caps is but one star
in the constellation of controversy over juror discretion in awarding
damages. The propensity for juries to award staggering sums in punitive
175

See Seidman Diamond, supra note SD1, at 290-91 (quoting Judge William
Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 119-46 (1990)).
176
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or compensatory damages has spawned an entire political movement
under the banner of “tort reform.”177 As jurors level punitive damages
that reach into the billions,178 legislatures and courts have begun
developing methods to cabin larger verdicts. Damage caps are one
straightforward way for legislatures to rein in juror awards. And the
Supreme Court has undertaken scrutiny of punitive damages under the
Due Process clause.179 All of these developments – both the massive
awards, as well as the efforts to review or restrain them – have generated
heated political controversy and a wealth of academic analysis and
debate.180
We do not seek to enter into this maelstrom in our limited
discussion here. However, our perspective on cap disclosure does
dovetail nicely with a growing consensus in the realm of damages
assessment: namely, the benefits of providing more information and
direction to juries in making their damages assessments.
As courts, practitioners, and academics have noted, jurors
generally get precious little instruction on how to calculate compensatory
and punitive damages.181 Instructions on compensatory damages may
simply be a recitation of the different categories of such damages: pain
and suffering, inconvenience, emotional stress, impairment of quality of
life, mental anguish, and other “nonpecuniary” losses.182 And punitive
damages instructions may simply recite the applicable standard for
177
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awarding them (e.g., “willful and wanton conduct,”), and then note that
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish.183 Even if an instruction
also counsels the jury to avoid “passion or prejudice,” such an instruction
on its own does little to provide structure to the jury’s contemplation. 184
Commentators fear that the unguided discretion provided to juries allows
jurors’ biases and judgmental deficiencies to take over the damages
deliberation process.185
There is voluminous debate about the extent to which jury
damage awards have gone “out of control.”186 However, there is greater
consensus that compensatory and punitive damages are unpredictable
and variable – namely, that similar injuries do not receive the same
compensation.187 Studies into this phenomenon have noted the difficulty
in translating underlying judgments about compensation and punishment
into actual dollar awards. In a study of juror decision-making, Sunstein,
Kahneman and Schkade surveyed jury-eligible citizens about potential
damages in a personal injury case.188 They found that there was strong
agreement across demographic groups about the level of outrage and
punishment to be directed at different factual scenarios.189 However,
they discovered that the jurors had real difficulty in mapping these
shared value judgments onto an unbounded scale of dollars.190 As a
183
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result, they found “severe unpredictability and highly erratic outcomes”
when it came to the dollar awards determined by participants.191 The
study showed that participants were susceptible to influence by available
anchors, any comparison cases that had been provided, or the limited
context that had been provided in some cases.192 Jurors were searching
for some kind of framing device and thus relied too heavily on whatever
context had been provided by the materials.193
Commentators have begun to coalesce around the notion that
jurors need more context and structure to their deliberations about
compensatory and punitive awards.194 Juries need more information, the
thinking goes, in order to correct place their awards within a predictable
and fair societal range. A variety of processes could be implemented in
order to provide more context. More specific jury instructions could
provide juries with more concrete factors or examples to assess when
making their determination.195 Caps could also provide context: the cap
tells jurors that the legislature believes damages should rise no further
than the amount of the cap. A more refined system of context would be
a framework of damage scaling or scheduling: the jury would be given a
series of characteristics about the case to evaluate, or a set of examples
of other cases to compare to their own.196 The jurors would thus be
asked to place their assessments within a framework of societallyacceptable damage awards. These frameworks could be constructed
along the lines of the federal sentencing guidelines: jurors would find
certain facts about the case and then correlate those facts to the
guidelines to determine the damages.197 Providing more context to the
expected to “monetize” pain and suffering even though there is no market for pain and
suffering and thereby no market price and no real standard to determine the proper
monetary amount).
191
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jury’s findings about pain, outrage, and punishment would enable jurors
to do their jobs more knowledgably and consistently.
Disclosure of the damage caps could thus be part of an overall
contextual framework for jurors in making compensatory and punitive
awards. Taking the caps themselves as a given, disclosure of the caps
would provide jurors with a context for their decisions. Ideally,
Congress would give the caps themselves further context for the jurors to
contemplate. For example, did Congress intend the caps as the
maximum that it believed any jury should award?198 If so, jurors could
be instructed that the purpose of these caps is to establish the maximum
amount of damages that can be awarded; thus, these damages represent
the most extreme end of the spectrum. In this way, the court would
acknowledge the effect of response scales on the jury and selfconsciously attempt to create such a scale for the jury to utilize. If this
scale were combined with instructions detailing the factors that should
go into determinations for compensatory and punitive damages, jurors
could be far more reasoned and systematic in their damage awards.199
It is perhaps more likely, however, that Congress did not intend
$300,000 as the maximum amount of damages that should reasonably be
awarded in all cases.200 Instead, Congress might have recognized that a
perfectly rational jury should, in some cases, award more than the cap,
but might have feared that actual juries would do so far more often than
would be proper.201 Thus, the cap would be based on Congress's
determination that juror bias in inflating damages required a cap that cut
off some higher awards that would be justified. Alternatively, Congress
might have created the caps not out of fear of juror inflation, but instead
as part of a political compromise. Under this reading of the statute, the
caps do not reflect an attempt by Congress to counteract juror bias, but
instead reflect a number that was acceptable to members of Congress.202
Under either of these scenarios, a scale for which $300,000 was the
198
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"maximum" would not reflect Congressional intent. Instead, courts
should inform the jurors of the cap, but also inform jurors of the purpose
behind the cap.203 If the cap is a response to juror bias, the court should
inform the jury that Congress has enacted statutory caps in response to a
consistent tendency of the jury to overestimate the amount of punitive
and non-economic damages. A straightforward acknowledgment of this
tendency could lead jurors to recognize it and be more thoughtful in
addressing it. If the caps result from a political compromise, the jury
could be informed that the statutory maximum is not meant as an
endpoint on a scale. By informing a jury that they have a damage cap,
but that the cap is not reflective of any value judgment about juries by
Congress, it might deflate any scaling effects that the number may have.
It could also be that the caps were enacted based primarily on a fear that
higher awards would potentially cripple employers economically.204 If
this fear were the driving force behind the caps, jurors should be
informed of this policy judgment along with the caps. Informed jurors
would then be more sensitive to potential economic harm and might
adjust their verdicts based on this Congressional policy.
Of course, the legislative history does not tell us exactly why
Congress enacted the current caps. But Congress could make clear for
the future, either in a statutory statement of policy or even in proposed
jury instructions, exactly what policy concerns the caps reflect. Instead
of presuming that jurors cannot handle the truth, Congress should use the
caps as an opportunity to direct the jury towards a proper level of
damages. Congress might even conclude that because a more informed
jury is better able to handle its responsibilities, it could eventually loosen
the cap.
Proponents of non-disclosure might object that an attempt to
provide a tighter framework for compensatory and punitive awards
might impair the "integrity" of the jury's damages determination.205
203
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While the notion of the "integrity" or "purity" of the jury's verdict is an
appealing one, it has several flaws. First, while non-disclosure of the cap
is meant to respect the integrity of the jury's determination, the cap itself
is a direct attack on that integrity. The cap represents a determination
that the jury cannot be trusted with unfettered discretion to award
damages. As one commentator, a proponent of non-disclosure, noted:
"Statutory caps reflect legislative conclusions that juries are ill-prepared
to make the inexact estimations inherent in the assessment of
noneconomic damages."206 It is hypocritical to be touting the importance
of the jury's unadulterated verdict right before that verdict is chopped
down to a pre-set statutory limit.
Second, not all information taints a jury's verdict. Obviously,
jurors need information in order to determine damages, and the relevance
or propriety of different types of information to that determination is
often hotly contested. The damage caps are arguably irrelevant to a
determination of the proper level of damages, since damages are
generally determined based on facts related to the case. However, the
caps do represent a Congressional determination about the maximum
level of damages for which any employer is potentially liable.
Moreover, the caps themselves reflect a Congressional intent to reduce
potential liability for small companies, and to provide a gradation based
on the number of employees. To this extent, the caps are plainly quite
relevant, as they reflect Congressional policy choices. Awareness of
these choices could be useful to the jury in making its damages
determination.
V
CONCLUSION
Congress deployed the damage cap non-disclosure provision in
the 1991 Civil Rights Act with little overt consideration of its
ramifications. In their thumbnail analyses of this provision, courts have
come to widely divergent conclusions about its purpose and effects. We
conclude that juror decision-making processes would likely be affected
by disclosure of the cap: most probably, smaller awards would rise and
larger awards would fall. However, a focus solely on these effects
ignores the larger impact that non-disclosure has on the judicial system
itself. In light of research about the importance of procedural justice, we
argue that concealing the cap has the potential to undermine the integrity
1991) (noting that no "upward or downward" pressure should be exerted on the juror's
verdict).
206
Kang, supra note MK1, at 492.

DAMAGE CAPS
and legitimacy of the jury system.
The best answer to the damage cap disclosure dilemma is more
complete knowledge of the caps and their context by juries. Namely,
rather than expressly preventing courts from disclosing the existence of
the damage caps, Congress should mandate disclosure in the context of
fuller instructions about damage determinations. Although jurors are
indeed likely to be influenced by exposure to the cap, this result stems in
part from the dearth of any other relevant or guiding information
provided to jurors about calculating damages. Disclosure and additional
contextual background will lead to more rational damage determinations.
And perhaps more importantly, it will help to protect and promote
perceptions that our justice system is legitimate, and fair.
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